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Standing at The Crossroads: An
Empirical Analysis of No-Fault
Automobile Insurance and Its
Potential Consequences
for Maryland
by William P. Atkins

Introduction
Continuing concern over the social
and economic problems caused by increasing insurance premiums and escalating awards has forced legislators to
consider alternatives within the automotive liability field. This movement has
led to proposals and laws focused on
changing the legal system's responses to
automobile insurance cases. In Maryland, one might say the legislators are
"standin' at the crossroad"! debating
which avenue to take. Proposed changes
have concentrated primarily on modifying negligence liability instead of liability coverage. Unfortunately, many proposed approaches realign fault, which is
the primary insurance mechanism.
Today, insurance companies, trial lawyers, editorial writers, consumer organizations, and politicians fill periodicals
with charges and counter-charges over
whether there is a litigation explosion
or a liability crisis in the automobile
insurance industry and who is to blame. 2
The controversy manifests itself in a
mandate for various reforms of the traditional tort system and in turn encourages persistent efforts to enact a form of
no-fault insurance. 3 In Pennsylvania, nofault insurance was repealed in 1984,4
yet no-fault advocates are trying to
implement it again. 5 In Maryland, the
efforts towards no-fault have met resistance from the Maryland Bar Association
and the Maryland Trial Lawyers Association. 6 Recently, the Medical and Chirug10-The Law Forum/21.2

ical Society of Maryland has fought proposed no-fault legislation that statutorily
dictates the cost of medical care provided to an accident victim. 7
Proponents argue that a no-fault policy keeps insurance premiums lower
than traditional liability insurance, decreases litigation, reduces delays in the
payment of claims, and increases victims' benefits. This article will analyze
these four claims in light of the empirical evidence produced by current and
past no-fault systems.
Concluding with a revelation of profitability, this article will dispel the insurance industry's defense that they are
currently losing money and therefore
must revert to a no-fault system. However, in order to understand no-fault
policies, it is necessary to first look
briefly at the traditional tort system and
the current insurance industry environment.
The Traditional Tort System
Automobile negligence laws were developed to compensate the victims of
negligent motorists and deter irresponsible driving behavior. 8 Automobile insurance was designed to protect the
negligent motorist from insolvency in
the event that liability was imposed on
him. Insurance not only attempts to
compensate victims for their injuries,
but also to allocate the risks associated
with operating automobil~s over a large
group and thereby limits the cost which
may fall upon anyone individual. 9

It is a basic premise that drivers who
injure must compensate their victims. If
the negligent driver's insurance company fails to provide adequate compensation, the injured party can file civil suit
against the negligent driver. Adequate
compensation can include monetary
awards for pain and suffering, disability,
disfigurement, economic loss, or death
caused by the negligence. 1O Economic
loss is typically comprised of medical
bills, lost income, and other financial
reparations.
In order to prevail in court, the victim
must prove who was at fault, the nature
and extent of any injuries suffered, and
whether the negligent party actually
caused the injuries.!! Having determined
a negligent act was committed, the
court or jury then makes an award to the
injured party based upon the facts presented. In this way, the traditional tort
system protects innocent victims of all
ages, income levels, and backgrounds by
allowing the factfinder, instead of an
insurance company, to decide an appropriate amount of compensation.
It has become increasingly popular
over the past few decades to view victim
compensation as the central purpose of
tort law, while disregarding the deterrent purpose.J 2 This view has particularly affected courts' judgments,n and
one can appreciate why they find it
appealing. Prior to the enlightened age
of liability insurance, a verdict for damages was limited to a man's wealth.

Today, however, judges and juries are
typically faced with a solitary victim and
a defendant backed by an insurance
company. These judges and juries realize that the insurance system was designed to absorb and widely distribute
the loss of an individual plaintiff. Therefore, given the general compassion for
accident victims, the superior lossminimizing abilities of insurance companies, and the activism of today's judiciary, tort law has become a system with
a preference for awarding compensation to meet a presumed need. 14 Yet,
deterrence is the quiet sister that shadows this compensation.
The Insurance Industry Today
With more than 2.5 million cars currently registered in Maryland, automobile accidents are inevitable. One study
estimated that a driver makes 200 observations per mile, twenty decisions per
mile, and one error every two miles. 15
These errors result in a near collision
once every 500 miles, a collision once
every 61,000 miles, a personal injury
once every 430,000 miles, and a fatal
accident once every 16 million miles. 16
An oligopoly is typically defined as a
form of monopoly in which the effective
control of the market is exercised by a
limited number of sellers. To gain market
share in an oligolopolistic industry, a
supplier might consider lowering his
prices. However, price cuts would reduce the comfortable profit margin,
potentially start a price war, and invoke
the vengence of the other suppliers.
In Maryland, the automobile insurance
market is essentially an oligopoly.J7 In
1987, more than 70% of all automobile
policies sold in Maryland were written
by 3% of the 250 licensed companies. 18
The top four companies (State Farm,
Allstate, Nationwide, and Geico) accounted for more than 54% of all privatepassenger auto liability coverage in Maryland for 1989. 19 In that same year, the
top eight companies enjoyed a combined market share of 71 % in Maryand. 20
Monopolistic practices and noncompetiveness such as this prompted
Congress to pass antitrust laws in the
beginning of this century. At the time
these laws were enacted, the insurance

industry was lobbying to be regulated by reasons. First, they claimed that the curthe federal government and thereby
rent insurance system frequently proimmune from antitrust laws. Until 1944,
duced unfair out-of-court settlements. 28
the insurance industry was mostly
In most instances, the victim was compensated for much less than his out of
exempt from the auspices of the antitrust laws. In that year, the United States
pocket expenses. 29 Second, the system
was "cumbersome and slow," with proSupreme Court ruled that insurance was
tracted litigation causing long delays in
interstate commerce and therefore sub21
the compensation of victims.3D Third,
ject to federal antitrust laWS.
the system was extremely wasteful in
Within one year, inSurance companies had cajoled congress into passing the
that less than 50% of all premiums paid
McCarran-Ferguson Act.22 The act makes
ever reached the victims. 31 Last, the sysantitrust legislation "applicable to the . tern encouraged dishonesty. Keeton and
business of insurance [only] to the exO'Connell believed that this dishonesty
tent that such business is not regulated
was due to parties overstating their
by state laws."23 Because insurance regclaims or defenses in order to be comulation was prevalent in every state,
pensated for their actual losses. 32 The
Keeton and O'Connell no-fault insurance
Congress had put insurance back under
the antitrust exemption umbrella, safe
plan was designed to alleviate these
from competition.
problems by establishing a minimum
In 1990, the U.S. House of Represendollar limit or threshold for instituting
tatives Judiciary Committee voted to efclaims, as well as by prOviding prompt
fectively repeal the McCarran-Ferguson
payment of medical expenses up to a
Act24 and handed the industry its first
moderate limit, regardless of fault. 33
defeat after forty-five years of maintainUnlike the traditional approach, a
ing the exemption. Additional Congresdriver involved in an accident under a
sional action is expected. This movepurely no-fault system would tum to his
ment from a legislatively permitted
own insurance company for all damages
regardless of fault or liability. Thus, in
oligopoly towards a competitive market
is one that should initiate price reforms
theory, no-fault insurance provides
that will inevitably benefit the concompensation to all those involved in an
sumer.25
accident. In the vast majority of cases,
however, compensation is limited to
purely economic losses such as medical
expenses, lost income, and does not in".. . 70% of all
clude monetary awards for pain and
suffering.
automobile policies
The injured party is only allowed to
plead
their case in court when the damsold in Maryland were
ages reach a certain amount or threshwritten by 3 % of the
old. Thus, an understanding of thresholds is crucial to the concept of no-fault·
250 licensed companies. " insurance, for they are the barriers that
prevent litigation and therefore lower
premiums. Access to the civil justice sysTheory of No-Fault Insurance
tem under a no-fault insurance policy is
The concept of no-fault automobile
typically permitted only when the cominsurance was first introduced in the
pensation surpasses a verbal threshold,
United States in 1932 by a group of
monetary amount, or a combination of
social scientists from Columbia Univerboth.
sity.26 Having fallen into academic obA verbal, sometimes called "definiscurity, it was resurrected in 1965 with
tional," threshold specifies the type of
the publication of a no-fault plan
injury for which one can sue. 34 The type
of injury usually specified is either a
authored by current Federal Judge
permanent one, one that results in death,
Robert E. Keeton (D. Mass.) and Univeror one which causes long term disability
sity of Virginia law professor Jeffrey
O'Connell. 27 In their paper, Keeton and
or disfigurement. A monetary, someO'Connell proposed that automobile intimes called "medical," threshold is
crossed when the cost of medical treatsurance reform was necessary for four
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ment exceeds a specified amount for
medical expenses. 35 Both of the verbal
and medical thresholds can be combined in a variety of ways to suit a legislator's compensatory requirements.
The first no-fault law was enacted in
Massachusetts on January 1, 1971, six
years after the Keeton and O'Connell
plan was published. 36 Within five years,
seventeen states had adopted it. Nevertheless, this trend reversed itself just as
quickly. Exasperated with spiraling
premiums and increasing litigation, a
number of states repeated their no-fault
laws: Nevada in 1979,37 Pennsylvania in
1984,38 North Dakota39 and Utah in
1985,40 the District of Columbia in
1988,41 and Georgia in 1991.42
Currently, 36 states utilize a form of
the traditional tort system whereas only
14 continue to use no-fault.43 Nine of
these traditional tort states, employ
"add-on" no-fault insurance. "Add-on" is
an option one can purchase and it provides compensation if the insured is hit
by a no-fault insurance holder. Additionally, the "add-on" feature typically
does not preclude litigation. "Add-on"
provides a victim with compensation
from his own insurance company in the
event he is hit by a no-fault driver.
Referred to as Personal Injury Protection (PIP) in Maryland, it provides up to
S10,000 in medical expenses and lost
wages. 44 Before 1989, PIP was a mandatory feature of Marylanders auto insurance; it is now optiona1. 45 It is interesting to note that while the premium for
PIP and bodily injury coverage in traditional tort states increased 60%,46 nofault states suffered increases such as
108% in Michigan and 206% in Pennsylvania. 47 On average, no-fault premiums
are 20% higher than those found in a
traditional tort system. 48

The Theory of Consumer's Choice
No-Fault Insurance
Out of the mirror house of no-fault
insurance came an idea sponsored by
the insurance industry and currently
being touted in Maryland as the solution
to our insurance crisis. 49 Labeled as consumer's choice no-fault, this new concept allows policyholders to choose
between traditional tort and no-fault
coverage. "Choice" no-fault insurance
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was created to give consumers a choice.
Unfortunately, the only choice is which
policy.
For example, the driver who elects to
maintain traditional tort coverage under
a "choice" plan is put at a severe disadvantage when recovering from an accident caused by a no-fault driver. Unless
he surpasses the legislatively mandated
threshold, the innocent traditional tort
driver is precluded from suing the negligent no-fault driver, thereby losing his
right to have a court determine fair
compensation for his injuries. 5o Thus,
the traditional tort policyholder must
file for benefits with his own insurance
company. However, these benefits are
limited to the amount of coverage specifically purchased by the traditional
tort policyholder.

UO n average, no-fault
premiums are
20% higher. . ."
An exception recognized by advocates of consumer's choice provides
that intoxicated no-fault drivers would
remain accountable for their conduct
and continue to be subject to judiciallydetermined liability. Unspecified in the
exemption, however, is whether a driver
must first be charged and convicted
with drunk driving before a civil suit is
allowed. Due to a number of factors,
including the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof, many drivers are
never charged with drunk driving, or
plead guilty to lesser charges. Furthermore, even if a driver is charged and
convicted with drunk driving, the insurance company that carries his policy typically denies liability coverage under nofault insurance because the driver was
convicted. Therefore, the "drunk" exception typically exposes the convicted
no-fault driver to full liability while neglecting to provide defense counsel,
reparations, or a damage award. Thus,
the traditional tort victim is left with the
convicted drunk driver's individual and
personal liability.

The Reality of No-Fault
Advocates for no-fault insurance claim
that their system will lower insurance
premiums, decrease litigation, reduce
delays in the payment of claims, and
increase victims' benefits. However, an
empirical look at the experiences of
states that enacted no-fault insurance
tells a different tale. In a no-fault insurance environment, premiums climb
after an introductory drop, litigation
increases as the victim is forced to sue
his own insurance company as well as
the negligent driver, and a victim's benefits, decreased through medical compromises, prove that faster benefits are
a fallacy.
Higher Premiums
No-fault supporters guarantee lower
premiums and yet, two no-fault states
head the highest premiums list. 51 From
1975 to 1982, automobile insurance
premiums in no-fault New Jersey increased by 162%.52 In Pennsylvania and
Michigan, no-fault states with benefits
comparable to New Jersey, premiums
increased by 206% and 108%, respectively.53 In the same period, premiums in traditional tort states such as
California, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana,
rose between 47% and 74%.54 Overall,
the nationwide premium in no-fault
states averaged 20% higher than in those
states maintaining traditional tort systems. 55 Nevada, Pennsylvania, North
Dakota, Utah, and the District of Columbia repealed their no-fault laws after
years of increasing auto insurance premiums. 56 Premiums actually dropped
50% after the repeal took effect in
Nevada. 57
No-fault advocates claim that the disparity between the statewide average
and city residents' premiums is drastically reduced if not completely negated.
Contrary to this claim, urban residents
have experienced the highest rates ever
under no-fault. While Baltimore City
residents pay 51 % more than Maryland's
statewide average, the disparity is even
greater in no-fault states. 58 Under nofault systems, Detroit residents pay 74%
more than the Michigan average,59 Miami
residents pay 116% more than the Florida statewide average,60 and Philadelphia residents pay 250% more than
the Pennsylvania average. 61

Another disadvantage of no-fault insurance is the elimination of safe driver
discounts. In traditional tort states, safe
drivers can often obtain substantial discounts. 62 No-fault not only eliminates
the safe driver concept, but discriminates against safe drivers by forcing
them to pay higher premiums in order
to subsidize those drivers who pose
greater risks. A comparison of the traditional tort premiums in Baltimore to nofault rates in Detroit shows this disparity
with a Baltimore City teenager paying
nearly the same amount as a 45 year old
married male in Detroit. 63
Baltimore Detroit Difference
Married Male,
age 45
$1,271
Single Male,
age 18
S2,851

$2,915

+129%

S2,815

-1.3%

A telling comparison of markets
involves Michigan with no-fault and its
neighbor, Ohio, with a traditional tort
system. These two markets are remarkably similar in population, size, urban to
rural ratio, and number of automobile
registrations. 64 However, Michigan, with
no-fault, has the nineteenth highest
average annual auto premiums in the
United States. 65 Ranked forty-second,
Ohio has one of the ten lowest average
premiums in the country. The inflated
premiums of Michigan residentsprompted then Governor James Blanchard to
state the following: "Our studies show
the rates are too high. We can cut the
rates for mandatory auto insurance coverage by 20% and freeze them without
reducing benefits or damaging the insurance industry."66 This disparity in premiums indicates that a similarly situated
traditional tort system is substantially
less expensive than a no-fault system.
Contrary to the assertions of its advocates, empirical data shows that premiums actually increased in states that
adopted a no-fault system. Having suffered through these premium increases,
many states have repealed no-fault and
seen their premiums drop. Furthermore,
urban drivers can look forward to drastic increases in their premiums under a
no-fault system, while good drivers will
be forced to subsidize the higher risk
drivers. Moreover, a comparison of premiums between a no-fault and traditional tort state revealed a disparity in
premiums (nineteenth and forty-

second) that can only be based on their
differing insurance systems. This tangible evidence confirms that no-fault advocates promises of lower premiums are a
fallacy.
Increased Litigation
In order to lower premiums, no-fault
requires a victim to surrender all legal
claims arising from an accident which
do not surpass a proscribed threshold. 67
In so doing, no-fault advocates propose
that litigation is reduced. However,
those victims who do not surpass the
threshold are not precluded from suing
their own insurance company in order
to obtain adequate benefits.

U[DJata shows that
premiums actually
increase in states that
have a no-fault system."
Accordingly, a 1986 study found that
these "first party" suits added to the
existing pool of emasculated claims in
no-fault states and actually helped
create a substantial rise in the number of
lawsuits. 68 The result is not surprising in
light of the typical verbal threshold provisions of no-fault legislation. Again, a
verbal threshold specifies the type of
injury for which one can sue.69 The District of Columbia's 1985 amendment to
their existing no-fault statute (since
repealed in 1988) allowed suit where:
[t ]he injury directly results in substantial permanent scarring or disfigurement, substantial and medically demonstrable permanent impairment which has Significantly
affected the ability of the victim to
perform his or her professional
activities or usual and customary
daily activities, or a medically demonstrable impairment that prevents the victim from performing
all or substantially all of the material acts and duties that constitute
his or her usual customary daily
activities for more than 180 continuous days.70
Similarly Michigan law prohibits the
initiation of an automobile negligence

suit unless the accident causes death,
serious impairment of a bodily function,
serious disfigurement, or the damages
exceed the prescribed limit for economic 10ss.7' The economic hurdle for
damages required before a suit may be
initiated, is set at 85% of earnings lost by
the victim up to $1,250 per month.7 2
This hybrid threshold forced Michigan
victims to file more than 6,000, "first
party" cases against their own insurance
companies in order to secure adequate
compensation for medical bills as well
as lost wages. Unfortunately, the increase
in litigation is indicative of serious decreases in benefits provided to innocent
victims. As we will see, insurance carriers in Michigan routinely terminated
benefits, and policyholders, consequently, could not afford to pay for
needed physical or occupational therapy.73 Furthermore, the insurance providers required many of their policyholders to be examined by "cut-off'
physicians, hired by the insurance companies to determine whether to end the
victim's medical treatment.
In a monetary threshold system, the
medical expenses of an accident victim
must surpass a legislated amount in
order to allow litigation. Although this
seems like a simple and uniform scheme,
the question of where to set the monetary hurdle and the effects thereof have
been the subject of much debateJ4 A
1982 study revealed that 24% ofall insurance claims were barred from tort recovery in five states with a $500 thresh01d,75 and an average of 35% of all
insurance claims were barred in three
states which implemented a $1,000
threshold. 76
Yet, no-fault does not decrease litigation. In reality, it has initiated entirely
new bodies of law. Furthermore, monetary threshold states allow access to the
litigation process for a majority of the
automobile negligence suits anyway.
These two avenues combine to increase
the current overloaded docket instead
of decreasing it.
Faster Benefits
The contention that victims collect
benefits more quickly under no-fault
insurance is equally misleading. In a nofault state, benefits are paid out more
quickly. No-fault proponents point to
Michigan's implementation and subse-
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quent data showing that a larger percentage of claims were paid out within the
first fifteen months after they were filed.
However, these statistics are misleading.
Although a higher percentage might be
paid out in the first fifteen months under
no-fault, a smaller amount is paid overall.
While concededly longer in a traditional tort state, the average time spent
in recovering benefits is caused by the
victim's need for full compensation and
continued health care. 77 Typically, victims of an accident in a traditional tort
state must determine the long term
impact of their injury before filing suit
because only then can they fully recover
for their injuries, pain and suffering, and
economic losses. The complete impact
an accident has on a victim's life is
inconcievable immediately after the incident. Thus, while the traditional tort
benefits might be slower, they do not
run the risk of short changing victims.
Compromises In Medical Care
Historically, insurance companies
have used three avenues to compromise
care and recovery with no-fault: restricted medical fees, "cut-off" examinations, and review of medical treatment. 78
By reducing the amount of benefits for
medical care, insurance companies reduce their payout and increase profits at
the expense of their injured policyholders.
Proposals have been made to limit
fees to the same schedules that the state
uses for worker's compensation or to
the schedule of benefits that a physician
receives if a patient has no insurance.79
Because the better and more experienced physicians refuse to work for
these reduced fees, accident victims will
be forced to turn to the few remaining,
and less qualified, doctors.
Typically, no-fault insurance incorporates a "cut-off' physician. These doctors are employed by the insurance
company and determine whether the
policyholder is no longer in need of
medical care. The objective is to terminate unwarranted and unjustified medical care. Often these examinations lead
to the termination of justified benefits
such as physical and occupational therapy, rehabilitation, wage replacement
and other medical care. Thus, this financially motivated "cutting off" could
potentially result in continued pain, dis14 - The Law Forum/21.2

ability, or permanent injury for the accident victim.
In addition to "cut off' physicians, nofault insurance policies often utilize
wording that allows a medical review.
With medical review, the insurance company maintains the right to examine a
policyholder's medical care and decide
whether all of the treatments are necessary. The scrutinized benefits include
physical and occupational therapy as
well as rehabilitation. If treatments are
found to be "unnecessary," the policyholder'S insurance company may refuse
to pay for them.

UAbolishing fault
eliminates deterrence and
undermines the concept
of accountability . .. "
These various avenues are used in nofault states to reduce the benefits to
policyholders and, consequently, have
resulted in a flood of lawsuits. Despite
the obvious disadvantages, proponents
of no-fault and consumer's choice nofault still believe their system is better
than the traditional tort system. In reality, no-fault insurance helps further minimize medical costs to the insurance
companies, while simultaneouslyreducing the advantages to the consumers.
Deterrence Is No Longer A Factor
Although insurance protection shifts
the direct economic burden of an accident from the tortfeasor to the insurance company, the compensation funds
ultimately come from the insured. In
turn, the claims paid out raise policyholders' premium rates, individually and
collectively. Three alternatives combine
to deter the public from driving negligently: increased insurance or premium
cost, the threat of cancellation or nonrenewal of coverage, and safety measures as a condition of coverage. so
Abolishing fault eliminates deterrence
and undermines the concept of accountability implicit in tort law. Negligent,
reckless, or even drunk drivers are
treated equally in terms of the coverage
they receive after causing an accident.
Suppose a habitually negligent driver

causes injuries in four separate collisions. Under no-fault, the driver pays
nothing to any of his victims and yet, he
is entitled to file four claims with his
own company to pay for his medical
bills, lost wages, and economic losses.
A decade after no-fault was implemented, an independent study revealed
that accident deaths rose by as much as
15% in no-fault states as compared to
traditional states.8 ! A similar empirical
study in 1982 revealed no-fault insurance in New Zealand was the cause of a
16% increase in automobile accident
deaths. 82 A 1982 study revealed a significant increase in fatal accidents in states
with tort restrictions similar to no-fault,
when compared to unrestricted states.83
The study found that, except for states
with very low tort thresholds, no-fault
has produced a statistically significant
increase in fatal accidents. For example,
studies found a medical expense threshold of $500 results in approximately a
4 % increase in fatal accident rates, as
opposed to a 10% increase in states with
a $1,500 threshold. 84 Although three subsequent studies found no significant
effects on fatality rates from the adoption of a no-fault system, the possibility
of deterrent efforts imposed by a traditional tort system cannot be ignored.85
Profitability of Automobile
Insurance Companies
In statistical debates that have raged
between supporters and opponents of
the traditional tort system, insurance
companies often point to their sizable
underwriting losses, proclaiming eminent insolvency if victims' rights are not
restricted. The industry's financial history, however, tells a story for stronger
regulation, not implementation of nofault insurance.
Premiums are often perceived as an
insurance company's only source of income. This might be due to the fact that
premiums are calculated to cover the
anticipated claims. However, since
policyholders are not immediately involved in accidents, the premiums that
they pay are invested and immediately
become a second source of income,
referred to as a continuing investment
account. By accumulating interest from
future underwriting costs, the continuing investment account is sheltered.
Investment income constitutes a sub-

stantial portion of the insurance company's profits. Underwriting loss, however, is merely an industry term that
refers to the amount paid out in claims.
It is not a loss in any real sense of the
term. Underwriting profits are the
amount realized after deducting the
money paid out for claims from the
premiums collected during a given
period. Thus, underwriting profits and
losses neglect to tell the casual observer
the whole tale. An underwriting loss
that was previously earning interest will
then be utilized to reduce the insurance
company's tax liability.
Another interest income that often
goes unnoticed is the reserves or the
amount the insurance company sets
aside to pay claims. Insurance carriers
routinely reserve amounts for claims
which they assume have occurred but
have not been reported. Insurance companies can "over-reserve," thereby minimizing profit statements and justifying
premium increases.
As opposed to a tax deduction, which
is generally subtracted from gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income
or taxable income, a tax credit is subtracted from the computed tax itself. In
effect, a tax credit reduces the amount

owed to the government in taxes. Nevertheless, an anticipated claim reduces the
amount paid in taxes on profits. This
creates a third source of income in the
form of tax credits granted by the federal government. However, most claims
are not immediately paid in full and
many claims are never paid.
The following chart reveals the tax
credits received by Maryland's three
largest auto insurance carriers: Allstate,
State Farm, and Nationwide. In the five
years shown, they reported a combined
increase in surplus revenue of over $9.7
billion nationwide and yet they received
over $178 million in combined federal
tax credits.86
Maryland's second largest insurer, Allstate, paid taxes only during one of the
five years examined. 87 Allstate amassed a
tax credit balance from 1985 to 1989 of
more than $488 million. 88 This half a
billion dollar tax credit was enjoyed
when the company's net worth increased
by $847 million. 89
Using information from the A.M. Best
Company, an insurance industry analyst
company, the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) conducted a thorough
study on the profitability of the automobile lines of the property/casualty insur-

Tax Credits in Dollars &om 1985 to 1989
Year

Allstate

State Farm

1985

276,870,000

41,820,957

1986

173,845,000

26,934,613

1987

(132,061,313 )

Nationwide

26,934,613

(582,440,084 )

17,222,676

1988

30,285,370

(323,671,681 )

(5,775,077)

1989

132,388,535

319,755,178

(29,467,344)

Total Tax Credits
611,000,000

346,641,928

85,978,246

Total Taxes Paid in Those Years
132,061,313

906,111,665

35,242,421

Addition to Coq~oration's Net Worth During Same Time Period
847,000,000

5,767,000,000

1,098,000,000

(bracketed numbers represent additional taxes and therefore no tax credit.)

ance industry from 1978 through
1987.90 Even though A.M. Best receives
its information exclusively from the
insurance companies themselves,91 .the
GAO found that for the ten year period .
from 1978 to 1987, automobile insurance lines netted an estimated after-tax
profit of about $22.6 billion nationwide,92 despite underwriting losses of
over $30 billion.93 The $22.6 billion dollar profit, therefore, reflects investment
gains of about $54 billion after taxes. 94
In 1987 alone, $78 billion in automobile insurance premiums were collected,
representing over 41 % of the premiums
from all types of insurance. In that same
year, losses totalled approximately $54
billion. Dividends returned to stock-.
holders were $1.5 billion, and the return
on investment was at the highest level of
the entire ten years of the study.95It does
not take a mathematics degree to see
that $1.5 billion in dividends and $54
billion in losses and expenses subtracted
from $78 billion in premiums leaves
$22.5 billion or 29% profit.
The insurance industry's cry of a lack
of profitability should go unheeded. The
foregoing statistics highlight a 29% profit
of $22.5 billion dollars in the automobile insurance industry alone. Between
tax credits, continuing interest accounts,
and anticipated claims coverage by current premiums, the insurance companies are living in a very comfortable
margin.
Conclusion
Proponents for no-fault argue that it
will keep insurance premiums lower,
decrease litigation, reduce delays in the
payment of claims, and increase victims'
benefits. This is simply not the case. Nofault insurance suffers from a number of
deficiencies. First, empirical evidence
suggests that after an initial drop, a nofault environment will demand higher
premuims. This fact and the impact of
skyrocketing premiums on urban
dwellers have forced states employing
no-fault to repeal their laws. Second,
because victims are prevented from obtaining compensation from a negligent
party, they are forced to sue their own
insurance companies. In Michigan, nofault resulted in a substantial increase in
these "first party" suits. Furthermore,
thresholds do not completely preclude
a majority of automobile negligence
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suits. Third, faster benefits are actually
smaller benefits. Fourth, in a no-fault
system, medical care is comprised of
restricted medical fees, "cut-off" examinations, or premature reviews of medical treatment. In reducing the amount of
medical care, the industry may reduce
its payout and increase its profits, but
only at the expense of the injured policyholder. In order to be adequately compensated, the victim is again forced to
sue his or her own insurance company.
Fifth, without fault, there simply is no
deterrence. The threat of rising premiums and loss of insurance is a motivation
for avoiding collisions. With this
negated, problems arise. Finally, although the insurance industry talks of
their underwriting losses, their investment accounts and tax credits tell a different story.
No-fault insurance has been an interesting and noteworthy experiment in a
few states. Those states that have experimented with this misaligned solution
should be commended for their attempts. However, the empirical evidence they created sh<?ws that no-fault
insurance increases premiums, fatalities, and litigation while decreasing
medical care and abating deterrence.
Clearly, no one should be standing in the
crossroads.
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